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FOREWORD
This study was performed under Contract NAS8-30849 for
`	 the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center of the National Aero-
	
`'	 nautics and Space Administration under the direction of James R.
r"
Turner, the Contracting Officer's Representative. The final.
	
'' o	 report consists of two volumes:
,E
E"-
	
4	 Volume I - Executive Summary,
Volume II - Technical and Cost Analysis.
	
g	 Additional documentation in the form of working papers
and drawings have been provided to Mr. Turner. Inquiries regard-
7P
ing this material may be addressed to the following individuals:
^a
James R. Turner, COR/TOSS Study
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center
Attention: PD--24
Huntsville, Alabama 35812
Telephone: (205) 453-4165
	
^a	 Dr. Gary D. Gordon
Communications Satellite Corporation
COMSAT Laboratories
Clarksburg, Maryland 20734
Telephone: (301) 428-4517
Supporting information was
	
W	 	 	 prepared under a parallel
study, Integrated Oribtai Servicing Study for Low--Cost Payload
Programs, Contract NAS8--30820. Inquiries regarding this naterial
may be addressed to Mr. Turner, or
a	 Wilfred L. DeRocher, Jr., TOSS Study
Martin Marietta Corporation
Denver Division
P.O. Box 179, Mail No. 0402
Denver, Colorado 80201
Telephone: (303) 979-7000, Ext. 3085
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I. INTRO?DUCTION
,f
A c-3mparison has been made of the following modes of main-
taining a satellite system:
Ll
a. expendable mode in which failed satellites are replaced,
b. on-orbit servicing where a satellite can be fixed by un-
manned module exchange in space, and
C. ground refurbishment in which the satellite is brought
back to ground for repairs.
It was concluded that on-orbit maintenance is the most
cost--effective mode and that it is technically feasible. It can
be used to repair failed satellites, to improve reliability of
operating satellites, and to update equipment. On-orbit servicing
can increase program flexibility and satellite reliability, life-
time, and availability. Analysis, design, fabrication of engineering
II
	
test units should continue as well as the evaluation of on-orbit
L	 servicers. Servicing of spacecraft in low orbit can begin in some
programs as soon as the shuttle is available. Widespread acceptance
of orbital servicing in geostationary orbit will probably not occur
until much later.
The significant conclusions and results reached by Martin
Marietta and COMSAT in two companion studies are summarized at the
beginning of Section V of this report. Each conclusion is dis-
cussed and supporting rationale presented either in Section V of
this report or in Section V of the Martin Marietta report, I which-
ever is appropriate.
The opinions and conclusions in this report were generated
in the course of this study. They should not be construed as offi-
cial COMSAT policy. COMSAT has made no commitment about on-orbit
servicing.
1
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II.	 STUDY OBJECTIVES
This study was done in parallel with a study' performed
by Martin Marietta (NAS8-30820). Close coordination was maintained
between the studies, and the results of the two studies complement
each other. The significant conclusions and results of bath studies
are presented in Section V.
NASA's fundamental objective for both studies was to
provide the basis for the selection of a cost-effective, STS-
supported rrbital maintenance system. This maintenance concept/cost
determination includes every operational, STS, and payload impact
which is affected by each maintenance concept. Many steadies have
already been made of on-orbit servicing. The objective in these
studies was not to be limited to a particular orbit, spacecraft
program, or maintenance mode. Rather, the objective was to include
the entire spectrum of spacecraft programs and maintenance modes.
COMSAT, as a commercial user of satellites, is in a unique
position to provide an evaluation of on-orbit servicing. COMSAT's
experience with communications satellites was used to make a special
evaluation of the servicing of these satellites. In addition, COMSAT
analyzed a servicing system from a user's viewpoint, identifying
design criteria for the service unit and spacecraft that are required
or desirable.
t 
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i	 III.
	 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER NASA EFFORTS
t	 A key input to the study was the spacecraft description
.0
defined by the Shuttle Systems Payload Data (SSPD) 1974 document.2
This document provided the number of spacecraft, the weights, and
the scheduled launch dates. A study of this document, from a main-
tenance viewpoint, indicated three separate classes. One group of
spacecraft, such as those launched into planetary orbit, was not
suitable for maintenance for obvious reasons. The other two groups
are those that can be reached by the manned orbiter and those that
require the use of an upper stage to attain their operating orbits.
Several maintenance methods exist in the low-orbit group that is
within reach since extravehicular activity and the shuttle remote
manipulator system are available.
In the group beyond the reach of the manned shuttle, the
largest potential users of an orbital maintenance system are com-
munications satellites in geostationary orbit. They have an extra
attraction in that the orbits are quite similar, and servicing of
a number of satellites can be done without excessive fuel required
to go from one to another. In addition to the communications satel-
lites, there are some earth observation satellites in the same orbit
that have similar requirements.
Table 1 lists the weight, desired time in orbit, and aver-
age number of satellites from the 1974 SSPD data for communications
and navigation satellites. The weight reflects the user's orienta-
tion towards either Delta or Atlas-Centaur weight launching
capabilities and may not represent optimum use of the STS capabil-
ities. The average number of satellites was not usually listed
directly, but was obtained from the launch schedule and the pre-
dicted lifetimes listed. For comparison, an independent estimate
of the number of satellites was derived from other sources and is
^	 also listed in Table 1. Although the distribution is somewhat
(^ li
Pi7 f
different, both estimates are of about 40 communications satel-
lites operating in geostationary orbit throughout the next decade.
This excludes U.S. military satellites, which adds significantly
to the expected total in orbit.
Table 1. Communications/Navigation Satellites
1974 SSPD Data
IndependentDesired
Satellite Time in Average Estimate
Weight Orbit Number
(kg) (yr) 185-190
International Communi-
cations Satellites 1,472 10 14 9
DOMSAT "A" 261 7 4
10
DOMSAT "B" 1,472 10+ 71^
Disaster Warning 583 5 1l^ 2
Traffic Management 29B 5 3 7
Foreign Communications 308 7 3 i2
DOMSAT "C" 868 7 4 3
Communications R&D -- -- 0 2
Weighted Average 1,050 7
Totals 37 4.5
For reaching geostationary orbit, a full capability tug,
30 ft long and capable of deploying 7900 lb, was assumed. It could
also retrieve 3400 lb, or make a round trip with 2070 lb of payload.
The specified maximum on-orbit stay time of 6 days for the tug is a
definite constraint if servicing of several satellites is desired.
It was assumed that this tug would be available in 1982, which
reduced the study period from 13 years (1578-1991) to 9 years
(1982-1991) .
4
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IV.	 METHOD OF APPROACH AND PRINCIPAL ASSUMPTIONS
Although there were two studies with the same objective
proceeding at the same time, there was no attempt, nor desire, to
duplicate effort. COMSAT's approach was to
a. provide information and assistance to Martin Marietta
as desired,
b. review the work being done on both studies for complete-
ness, and
c. perform tasks that complemented the other study.
Studies done by Martin Marietta covered the entire SSPD traffic
model; COMSAT reviewed the whole picture, but used its expertise
with communications satellites as a check point.
Several assumptions were made in the two studies. Only
unmanned spacecraft were included, that is, spacecraft that operate
without the presence of man. Also, for spacecraft beyond the reach
of the orbiter, unmanned maintenance was assumed; this could be
remotely controlled from the orbiter, but more likely would be con-
trolled from the ground. Module exchange was the only type of
maintenance seriously studied since this promises to be the most
cost effective. Other types of servicing, such as inspection with
a TV camera, moving spacecraft to a different orbit, use of a manip-
ulator, aid in deployment of solar arrays or antennas, etc., are
possible and may be done in some cases, but their use would not
change the total picture.
In comparing an expendable system of satellites with
on-orbit servicing or ground refurbishing, the number of launches
was usually held constant; that is, a failure was assumed to occur
after a neri^d of years, and the satellite was either replaced with
a new one (expendable mode), replaced with a ground spare and the
old one taken to the ground (ground refurbishment), or fixed in
r
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space (on-orbit servicing).
	 While the simplest approach was to 1
keep the number of launches constant, one of the potential bene-
fits of on-orbit servicing was missing.
	 One alternative studied
briefly was to perform on-orbit servicing more frequently to im-
prove satellite reliability and decrease the cost of each servicing
since more servicin s are done and the servicing is less u rgent.g	 g	 g .s
The results of this alternate study showed that while total program
costs increased, the benefits justified this small increase.
It was also assumed that additional launches were for
the purpose of replacement, and that the same function could be
performed by on-orbit servicing.	 In some cases it is impossible
to tell from the SSPD data whether a different spacecraft is being ;
launched or whether a duplicate replacement is planned. 	 As will ^.
be discussed later, the ratio of the program life (how long before
the satellite is obsolete) to the satellite lifetime (how long be- 1',
.-F
fore the satellite fails) has a critical effect on the usefulness
of on-orbit maintenance.
The requirements for building a serviceable satellite
were studied, but it was assumed that equal amounts of redundancy
would be used compared to an expendable satellite. 	 While this
assumption is made on most servicing studies, it is not clear that i
an optimum has been chosen.
	 While some redundancy will be desired 71
on a serviceable satellite, there are some subsystems where redun-
dancy could be eliminated.
	 As an example, north-south stationkeeping
thrusters are often redundant, yet they are used only a few times a
year and could be replaced by a servicer within that time.
	 Hence, 'f
redundancy of a north-south thruster is probably not justified for
a serviceable communications satellite.
All spacecraft have been assumed to be body stabilized;
many satellites are now body stabilized and more are expected.
While servicing of spinning satellites is technically feasible,
the additional complexity and cost does not make it attractive. a
6
An additional assumption is that the attitude control is operational
when servicing occurs.	 This is a reasonable assumption for most
satellite fai l ures will not affect the attitude control system.
Furthermore, if the attitude control system has failed, it may be
possible to control the attitude through an alternate mode for a
limited time.	 Many attitude control systems have different sensors
that can be used, and a thruster system can also be used if momentum
wheels have failed.	 The assumption that the satellite attitude is
fixed and known (even though it may be in a backup stabilization mode)
simplified the docking operation and should be made.
For purposes of communications satellite design, a configu-
ration was assumed based on satellites to be launched in the next
few years.	 Even though these satellites are not cand i dates for on-
orbit servicing, technical details are better known. 	 A request for
proposals has recently been issued by INTELSAT for an INTELSAT V
launch in late 1979.	 It is obvious that this is definitely not a
candidate for on-orbit servicing and, in fact, will probably not be
modularized, the first step toward an on-orbit serviceable design.
Early definition studies on INTELSAT VI, the next genera-
tion of commercial international communications satellites, have 'j
been started.	 Current planning, based on requirements predicted J
by international communications traffic forecasts, calls for a
Ell!
first launch in 1986. 	 Based on previous time scales, the request
for proposals for INTELS*AT'VI will be issued around 1982. 	 Hence,
this may be a candidate for on-orbit servicing, but only if a repre-
sentative on-orbit demonstration is carried out before the RFP is
issued, probably in 1981 or 1982. 	 Delaying this demonstration until
the mid-1980's will probably preclude even INTELSAT VI from being a
2
candidate for on-orbit servicing.
21
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BhSELINE APPROACH TO ON-ORBIT SERVICING
As an introduction to the study, a brief review will be
given of how an on-orbit servicing might be done on a spacecraft.
A satellite provides information by means of its func-
tioning and its telemetry. A decision to do a maintenance function
(either replacement or repair) is based on the satellite's expected
performance in the near future and the cost of the maintenance 	 J
function. Decisions may also be affected by availability of modules,
spare satellites, and/or transportation.
Once the decision is made, the servicer and module are put
in the shuttle/tug and taken to geostationary orbit. Orbit tracking
places the tug with the servicer within less than a kilometer of the
spacecraft. Acquisition of the spacecraft is then accomplished by
means of radio waves or light, and a closer approach is made. Most
studies assume that rendezvous and docking will be done by tech-
niques already developed and proven.
After docking, a pivoting arm servicer removes a module
from the spacecraft and replaces it with a new module from the
stowage rack. The old module is stored in the stowage rack which
may or may not be returned to ground. Several modules may be
replaced; while the servicing may have been initiated by one module,
the exchange of other: , modules may be desirable. During this pro-
f
cedure, the attitude control of the spacecraft has probably been
turned off, and the tug maintains attitude control.
After module exchange, some checking may be done through L..
the spacecraft telemetry. Additional checking would be done after
the tug/servicer have undocked, but while they are still in the 	 i
vicinity of the spacecraft. The tug may then go on to service
another spacecraft or return to low orbit.
	 it
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V.	 BASIC DATA GENERATED AND SIGNIFICANT RESULTS
u	
The significant conclusions and results reached in the two
u	.integrated orbital servicing studies are presented below with the
major conclusions shown in italics. Many secondary results and
supporting conclusions are given in the rest of this section and
in the Technical Volume. The following significant conclusions
and results were generated by the principal parties in the Martin
Marietta and COMSAT studies. These conclusions, where COMSAT has
L performed a significant part of the work, are discussed and their
supporting rationale are presented in the remainder of this section.
1. Top--Level Conclusions
a. on-orbit maintenance is the most cost-effective mode.
b. Spacecraft can be designed to be serviceable with accept-
able design, weight, volume, and cost effects.
c. The module exchange form of servicing is applicable to
repairing failed satellites, improving reliability of
operating satellites, and updating equipment.
d. Analysis, design, --ngineering test unit fabrication, and
evaluation of on-orbit servicers should continue.
e. On-orbit servicing can increase program flexibility and
satellite reliability, lifetime, and availability.
f. Ground refurbishment is not cost effective for most geo-
synchronous satellites.
0
fl
2. Maintenance Concepts
a. The on-orbit servicer maintenance concept is recommended.
b. The on-orbit servicer, extravehicular activity, and shuttle
remote manipulator system are all technically feasible.
c. Only the on-orbit servicer is applicable to both tug- and
orbiter-based missions
d. Remote control of module exchange with an on-orbit servicer
is technically feasible.
ii
3. On-Orbit Servicers
a. The pivoting arm on-orbit servicer was selected and a pre-
liminary design was prepared.
b. On-orbit servicer concepts exist that will permit a broad
range of spacecraft design alternatives.
c. On-orbit servicing is compatible with standardized modules
or spacecraft, but does not require them to be effective.
d. Side- and bottom-mounting forms of space replace-able unit	 LI
interface mechanisms are useful and have been designed.	 it
;j
4. Economics Evaluations
a. Use of on-orbit servicing over the twelve nears covered by
s.^	 the 1974 SSPD and the October 1973 PayZoad Model results
in savings greater than
® nine billion dollars over the expendable mode, and
four billion dollars over the ground-refurbishab-Ze mode.
b. The life cycle costs of the on-orbit servicer represent
approximatel.y.one percent of the overall savings, and
1
u
A
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HUI j
c. Cost sensitivity analyses showed that wide variations in =i
`f
cost data, especially mission model size and fraction of
spacecraft replaced, affect specific savings but do not
change the major study conclusions. }
d. A long-life free-flying servicer at geostationary orbit is
potentially cost effective. r
e. Specific launch cost reimbursement policies can be an
important factor in which form of servicing is adopted
for individual spacecraft programs.
f. Expendable satellites are cost effective where satellite
lifetime meets program lifetime requirements.
z
5. Development implications
a. A single development of an on--orbit servicer maintenance
issystem is compatible with many spacecraft programs and
recommended.
j b. Orbital maintenance does not have any significant impact j
on the space transportation system. 3
c. On-orbit maintenance with the pivoting arm servicer is
compatible with a variety of delivery vehicles such as the
orbiter, full capability tug, tree-flying servicer, solar
electric propulsion system, earth orbital teleoperator
system, and some forms of the interim upper stage.
tl
6. User Acceptance
HUI
a. Users need guarantees that servicing will be available and
assurances that it will be cost effective.
,.$ b. A deeper understanding of the orbital servicing cost
► structure is required before initiating drastic changes ^	 ^{
11
5b
in conventional satellite construction and operations
methods.
C. Scheduling delays of several months are tolerable for
many servicing requirements..
d. Development of the on-orbit servicer should include early
in--space demonstrations of module exchange along with
rendezvous and docking.
e. Building, fl7ing, and servicing a serviceable satellite
is needed to obtain widespread acceptance of orbital
servicing.	 }
PRIMARY CONCLUSIONS
Ia. On-orbit maintenance is the most cost-effective mode.
This is the most important conclusion of the two studies.
Various assumptions and qualifications are given throughout the
two reports.	 On-orbit maintenance is more cost effective for large
spacecraft than for small ones and for low orbits than for high
orbits.
lb.	 Spacecraft can be designed to be serviceable with accept-
able design, weight, volume, and cost effective,
Studies that have focused on individual projects have
designed serviceable spacecraft. 4 ' 5 	Part of this study consisted
of the design of a serviceable satellite suitable for international
communications. 	 Some of the details are presented here. f
The serviceable communications satellite is a modularized
design based on 48 travelling wave tubes (TWTs), divided yap into
eight modules with six TWTs per module. 	 Travelling wave tubes
which have 6-W RF outputs with a heat dissipation of 14.8 W and a
maximum allowable collector temperature of 45 °C have been considered.
J^
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The radiator requirement of this module then sized the face of
the module, which looks either north or south (perpendicular to
the orbit plane) for a geosynchronous orbit.
A new type of travelling wave tube is a dual collector
unit. This type of tube with a 5-W RF output, for example,
would have 9 W of heat dissipation with a maximum allowable
collector temperature of 75°C. This combination of higher effi-
ciency and higher allowable radiator temperature would allow for
a smaller module.
Gather modules which have size problems are the attitude
control module and the stationkeeping or hydrazine module. An
attitude control module with an externally gimbaled momentum
wheel is a large unit. For a mid-1980's satellite, however,
the technology can easily be extrapolated to skewed reaction
wheels, an internally gimbaled momentum wheel., or a much higher
speed momentum wheel using magnetic suspension and a fiber--
reinforced rotor. Any of these developments will result in
a much smaller wheel or wheels which will allow for a smaller
attitude control module.
The four stataionkeeping modules each contain about
105 lb of hydrazine to support a full 7-year mission (AV 1300
ft/s) of attitude control and stationkeeping. Due to very high
hydrazine weight penalties (300 lb for INTELSAT IV and 400 lb
for INTELSAT IV-A), associated primarily with north-south sta-
tionkeeping of communications satellites, both bipropellants
and electrically augmented hydrazine systems are being seriously
considered. Either of these would raise the specific impulse
from 220 to 300 s which would reduce the amount of propellant
required, thus resulting in smaller tank requirements.
13f
s	 .
i
The trend in all these areas seems to be toward smaller,
lighter components. In addition, INTELSAT V will have approxi-
mately one-quarter of its transponders operating in the 11- and
14-GHz band, which should also result in small components. The
mid-1980 time frame should also allow time for the nickel-
hydrogen batteries to replace the nickel-cadmium batteries,
resulting in energy storage capacities of 18 Whr/lb rather than
the current 6 Whr/lb.
On the basis of these trends, the module size has been
t
chosen as 16 x 24 x 36 in. to allow for latch and attach mechan-
isms and to permit the overall structure to fit comfortably into
the shuttle cargo bay. This configuration is reflected in the f
model of an advanced modularized communications satellite shown
in Figure 1. The module weights are given in Table 2, and the
weight of the entire spacecraft is shown in Table 3. A model of 	 -'
this satellite was built and photographed by Martin Marietta.
The weight penalty for a modularized satellite as opposed	 t;
to an expendable, non-modularized satellite such as INTELSAT IV-A
or INTELSAT V is estimated to be between 20 and 30 percent. Even
if the weight of many components is reduced as a result of advanced
technology, the penalty expressed in percentage form should still
be about the same. An exact comparison is difficult because INTEL-
SAT V, the expendable baseline case, will have only 27 operating
transponders (plus spares) a factor which has an effect on the power
supply weight. The important conclusion is that the weight penalty
associated with an exchangeable module-type design is estimated at
20 to 30 percent rather than a factor of 2 or 3, as concluded by
some early studies.
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Table 2. Modularized Spacecraft Module Weights
Present Technology
Module
Component
Weight
(lb)
Structure,
Harness,
Connectors
(lb)
Latch/
Attach
Mechanisms
(lb)
Total
Weight
(lb)
No. of
Modules
(lb)
System
Total
(lb)
TWT 60 12 14 86 8 688
Receiver 66 13 14 93 1 93
Attitude Control 60 12 14 86 2 172
Battery and T&C 75 14 14 103 2 206
Battery and Converter 60 12 14 86 2 172
Propulsion 120 21 14 155 4 620
1951
Table 3. Modularized Spacecraft Weight
Modules	 1951
Structure and Harness	 325
Temperature Control	 60
Solar Array	 125
Antenna, Feeds	 250
Total
	
2711	 lb
a'__ I
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The details of the relationshi p between the latch/attach
machanism and heat transfer have not been worked out. To minimize
temperature gradients within the module, the electronic components
should be mounted on the inside surface of the module radiator plate.
This should be a fairly thick plate to diffuse the heat from the
components uniformly over the radiator surface. The latch/attach
side of the module should also be reasonably thick to take the
loads required to mate the connectors. It may be possible to inte-
gratethese two requirements into the same side of the module if
'	 the latch/attach mechanism does not overly constrain the component
mounting problems or cause excessive blockage of the radiator view
-!	 to clear space. A reasonable compromise could be to mount the
latch/attach mechanism to one of the east /west sides of the module.
In that case, the components could be mounted on both the inside
of the radiator and the latch/attach side, and the thick plate of
the latch/attach side could efficiently transfer the heat from the
components to the radiator.
I^
	
	 Figure 1 shows the layout for the modules. The higher
power dissipation modules (the transponder or TWT modules) are
located with a direct view to space through the north or south
4	 faces of the satellite. The concept envisioned is that the space-
craft structure allows the modules to "look through" the structure
Lin a north or south direction so that the module can essentially
contain its own radiator. Thus, the other five faces can probably
be designed adiabatically so that the thermal design of the modules
balances the internal power dissipation versus the net external heat
exchange from the radiator.
u
HIJ
1The propulsion modules are located in the four corners
for advantageous location of the thruster modules. Each module
is envisioned to contain one center-fed hydrazine tank with a blad-
der retention device and a thruster module of five thrusters. The
total of 20 thrusters on the spacecraft allows for full functional
redundancy for all attitude control and stationkeeping modes with
one of the four propulsion modules inoperative. With one module
failed, east-west stationkeeping will result in some small propel-
lant penalty by requiring the firing of a yaw axis thruster to
compensate for the resulting disturbance torques about the yaw
axis. Also the loss of one propulsion module will result in a
satellite center of mass shift as propellant is drawn from the other
three modules. The maximum value of this shift has been calculated
as 4 in. along the roll axis. During north-south stationkeeping,
the disturbance torque resultin g *:.rom this shift can be offset by
off-modulation techniques of the stationkeeping thrusters.
The battery modules are also located so that their radia-
tor can have direct views to cold space because battery cells should
be kept at low temperatures (-10°C) for long cycle life.
For efficient satellite configuration, some of the modules
are located so that they have no direct views to space. In this
layout these modules are the attitude control modules and a receiver
module. It should be possible to design these low-power modules to
transfer their heat load to the spacecraft structure for eventual
radiation to space. The attitude control modules contain an atti-
tude sensor and a processor as well as momentum storage devices.
Figure 1 shows an earth sensor located in each attitude control
module which must be able to look through the spacecraft bus to
have a view of the earth for attitude reference and error deter-
mination. There may also be small antennas for operation with RF
1P
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beacons on the earth. The important requirement is that either
module must be capable of supplying the complete attitude control
function for the satellite.
E
	
	
For this satellite, the docking face for module exchange
is the anti-earth face. It should be recalled that this is a com-
munications satellite in geosynchronous orbit. One side of the
satellite always faces the earth so that the communications
^j	 antennas can be attached to this face. In addition, the satel-
lite is 3-axis stabilized so that one face always faces north
jand one side south. These are the faces used as the heat rejec-
tion radiators. Since the plane of the ecliptic is inclined at
23.5 0 to the equator, the sun can shine on the radiator surfaces
only at 66.5 1 off the radiator normal. The solar array drive
axes, which are perpendicular to these faces, are located to pass
through them. Also, there is always one face facing east, one
face facing west, and one face looking away from the earth. The
latter face, known as the anti.-earth face, has been chosen as the
docking face for several reasons:
a. there is no interference with the antenna;
b. there is no interference with the solar arrays; and
c. all modules can be reached from a single docking.
Meteorological satellites, which may also be body-
stabilized with an earth view face to mount the sensing instru-
ments, may be candidates for the same type of on-orbit servicing
configuration.
Problems addressed in the study which need further atten-
tion are those associated with connectors. Since the satellite
is a communications satellite with eight transponder modules and
one receiver module, the RV interconnections are quire complicated.
There may be as many as eight RF connectors on the receiver module
and four on each of the transponder modules. Since a number of
different frequencies may be utilized, a number of different
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waveguide sizes will be required and the alignment tolerances
may be quite severe, e.g., ±0.003 in. for a 14-GHz waveguide.
The connectors will be required to have low dissipative losses,
low leakage losses, and low voltage standing wave ratio (VSWR)
losses. Problems of leakage may also be quite severe. Hence,
an experimental hardware program to build such connectors and
actually measure losses and leakage when using an automated latch/
attach mechanism would be valuable. These types of connectors
would probably use alignment pins, a short length of flexible
waveguide, and RF choke couplings with crushable gaskets as shown
in Figure 2. Reproducibility of results over a number of opera-
tions would be required.
The case of multiple--pin electrical connectors also
requires hardware demonstration to show the compatibility of the
latch/attach mechanism with the alignment accuracy and forces
required.
1c. The module exchange form of servicing is applicable to
repairing failed satellites, improving reliab,ility of
operating satellites, and updating equipment.
To evaluate servicing, it is useful to look at past sub-
systemfailures and defects that have occurred on communications
f
satellites (see Table 4). While this list is not complete, and
the same failures will not occur in the future, the overall pic-
a
ture is probably applicable to future failures. The large list
of INTELSAT satellites is due to the author's more extensive
knowledge of these satellites and the large number of satellite
years represented by these satellites. In spite of the problems
listed, some of these satellites have not only fulfilled their
mission, but have continued to provide service well beyond their
design life. Early Bird is an example of a satellite that might
be used today if it could be refueled. (It might be rented to a
foreign country as a domestic satellite.)
20
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Figure 2. Waveguide Alignment Compensation Device
Table 4. Typical. Subsystem Failures of
Communications Satellites
Satellite	 Component Failure Type Reparable
COURIER	 Decoder Design Yes
TELSTAR	 Decoder Design Yes
Battery Random Yes
RELAY	 Pourer Conditioning Random Yes
SYNCOM	 Telemetry Random Yes
EARLY BIRD	 Fuel Depletion Wear-out Yes
NIMBUS a	Solar Array Bearings Design Difficult
ATS-5	 Attitude Control Design No
TACSAT	 Structural Bearings Design Difficult
DSCS-2	 Deployable Structures Design No
TELESAT
	
Power Conditioning Random Yes
INTELSAT II 	 Battery Random Yes
Propellant Feed Design Probably
Propellant Relief Design Yes
Valves
Solar Array Degradation Design Probably
INTELSAT III	 Structural Bearings Design Difficult
Low Orbitb Random Yes
Battery Random Yes
Receiver Design Yes
Transponder Random Yes
Earth Sensor Design Yes
INTELSAT IV	 Receiver Design Yes
Thruster Design Yes
Earth Sensor Random Yes
Telemetry Beacon Random Yes
aNIMBUS is not a communications satellite, but had a problem
that may occur on future communications satellites.
bone INTELSAT III was injected into a low transfer orbit;
hydrazine propulsion was used to achieve proper orbit.
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in the column labeled "type" in Table 4, failures have
been classified in terms of reliability. A "design" failure occurs
j	 early in life; its identification indicates that the reliability
was not as high as planned. In some cases this may actually be a
i problem associated with the original design of the part; in other
i,	 cases the original design may be satisfactory, but a problem may
have occurred in the production (quality control).
i
A "random" fa i lure may occur at any time; a single occur-
rence does not chang: the estimate of the component reliability.
Usually the failure rate is assumed to be constant, and such a fail-
ure can occur at any time in the life of the satellite. A "wear-out"
is a failure that occurs late in the design life of the satellite;
it may be an actual wearing out or some other expected failure such
as fuel depletion. in a few cases the classification of failures
is arbitrary. For example, the failure rate of some components may
i	 increase with time; a failure may occur early in the life of the
satellite (random), but becomes more likely as the satellite becomes
older (wear-out).
The column entitled "reparable" in Table 4 is an estimate
of whether a failure is serviceable; this depends on the design
e	 of the serviceable satellite and the design of the servicer. Theo-
retically any failure of a serviceable satellite can be repaired in
i space by a remote manipulator, but some repairs may not be cost
effective. The economical approach to this question assumes that
most of the subsystems are built as replaceable modules; that the
satellite retains some capability for attitude control, orbit deter-
mination, and rendezvous; and that the servicer can exchange
modules rind do little else. Even with these limitations, most of
the failures can be repaired in a serviceable satellite.
A striking feature of Table 4 is the large number of
design dailures. This makes servicing more attractive for two
reasons:
t?
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a. repairing a satellite early in its design life provides
years of additional service, and
b. often such a failure suggests servicing of similar
satellites in which failures have not yet occurred.	 -i
It should also be noted that only one wear--out failure is listed. 	 .;
At present most communications satellites have not reached the
point at which wear-out failures predominate.
In the design of a servicing system, it is useful to
know the effects of various fai l-ures and the urgency of the repair.
For each of the subsystem failures in Table 4, the effect of the
failure, the allowable repair time, and the remedial action taken
(if anv) are listed in Table 5.
The allowable repair time is subjective. Usually the
urgency is less when the satellite is first injected into orbit
because the user is not dependent on the satellite, and traffic
requirements (if any) are smaller. on the other hand, when a
communications satellite is in operation and a critical subsystem
fails, a repair is desirable immediately, preferably within min-
utes or seconds. However, there are often alternative modes of
operation which permit repairs to be delayed. Eatteries, for ex-
ample, are needed only during the eclipse season. Furthermore,
battery failures are usually preceded by about a year's warning
so that replacement can be scheduled in advance,
Note that half of the repairs in Table 2 can be delayed
for months or years. This may be surprising to those who believe
that a communications satellite should be serviced in a week or
two. However, it is a direct result of the redundancy built into
communications satellites, the fact that not all subsystems are
used continuously, and the warning of failure (or graceful degra-
dation) that often precedes actual failure.
Table 5. Consequences of Subsystem Failure
Satellite Component Effect
Repair
Time
Remedial Action
FailedAllowed Satellite Others
COURIER Decoder Lost Command Days
TELSTAR Decoder Lost Command Days --- ---
Battery Low Eclipse Power Months -- ----
RELAY Power Cond. Lost 3 Weeks Days Self-repair ---
SYNCOM Telemetry Lost Information Months --- ---
EARLY BIRD Fuel Depletion Lost Position Years --- ---
NIMBUS Solar Array Lost Power Hours --- -_-
Bearings
ATS-5 Attitude Control Lost Attitude Weeks --- ---
TACSAT Structural Lost Attitude Seconds --- ---
Bearings
DSCS-2 Deployable Lost Attitude Dayw --- ---
Structures
TELESAT Power Cond. Lost Power Days ---- ---
INTELSAT II Battery Low Eclipse Power Months --- ---
Propellant Feed Lost Position Months ---- __-
Propellant Re- Lost Tank Pressure Months ---- ----
lief Valves
Solar Array Power Degradation Years --- +Cover
Degradation
INTELSAT III Structural Lost Attitude Seconds Invert +Heaters
Bearings
Low Orbit Wrong Position Weeks Reposition ---
Battery Low Eclipse Power Months ---- ---
Receiver Lost Amplitude Weeks --- Fixed
Transponder Lost Channel Days --- ---
Earth Sensor False PIP Months Another +Test
INTELSAT IV Receiver Lost Amplitude Months ---- QC
Thruster Lost Some Life Years Another +Connect.
Earth Sensor Extra Noise Months --- ----
Telemetry Beacon Lost Redundancy Months I	 ---- ----
C7
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As might be expected, the remedial action taken on
present "expendable" satellites is limited. Nevertheless, there
are cases in which redundant components (or an alternate mode)
can be commanded on, cases in which special commands have been
given to minimize a problem, and at least one case in which the
satellite has fixed itself. (In RELAY a crack in a transistor
case allowed moisture to leak in; once in space, the moisture
leaked out and the satellite repaired itself.)
More significantly, a number of subsystem failures have
led to specific changes on other satellites in the same program.
This is excellent proof that, if servicing were available,
changes would be desirable on satellites already launched.
Because design failures are common, and because they
are especially significant in terms of servicing missions?
Table 6 highlights the subsystem failures or anomalies in
INTELSAT satellites. This table includes several anomalies not
considered serious enough for inclusion in preceding tables. The
first column notes the number of satellites in which design fail-
ures have been observed. The next column notes the number of
satellites in which a replacement module is needed. to estimate
this figure, the severity of the problem is compared with the
estimated cost of a servicing mission. in a number of cases the
severity is not sufficient to justify a mission; yet if the sat-
ellite were to be serviced for another reason, that module would
be replaced.
On the basis of these statistics, it can be predicted
that, on the average, each new program can expect two design
failures, of which one is sufficiently serious to warrant a mod-
ule replacement. The time at which a failure has appeared in
programs to date has varied from a few hours to 4 years. On the
average a design failure appears about one year after injection
26
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Number of NumberNeeding Total Satellites
Satellite Component Failures Replace_Observed Injected Launched
ment
Ii Propellant Feed 3 3
Relief Valves 3 3 3 4
Solar Array 1 0
III Structural Bearings 5 5
Receiver l 1 5 8
Earth Sensor 5 0
IV Receiver 4 4
Thruster 1 1
7 8
Structural Bearings 2 0
Earth Sensor 1 0
TOTAL	 26 17 15 20
Table 6. Design Failures or Anomalies in
Communications Satellite Subsystems
a^
m^
of the first satellite in the progran. An additional year or two
is required to identify the cause and to procure replacement modules
without the defec^..
In summary, if servicing is available, most communications	 a
satellites will use it. In the first three years of a system of
satellites, it can be expected that every satellite will require
module replacement due to design failures. During the life of a
satellite, the probability that servicing will be required to cor-
rect a random failure is somewhere between 0.5 and 1.0. If the
satellite lifetime is extended beyond present design lifetimes,
additional satellite servicing will be required to fix wear-out
failures and additional random failures.
f
ld.	 On-orbit servicing can increase program fZexibility
and satellite reliabili ty, 	 Zifetime, and availability.
In many studies of servicing it has been assumed that
V^
the satellite is untouched until it fails; at that point it is
either repaired (servicing system) or replaced (expendable mode).
if the delay in replacing the satellite is equal to the delay in
repairing it, the availability is unaffected.	 However, availabil-
ity is important to commerical communications satellite systems.
Hence, a simulation study has been conducted to investigate the
effect of different modes of servicing on availability.
One method of decreasing the cost of servicing is to
service more than one satellite in a trip. 	 This requires one
satellite to be serviced at a time that may be determined by
failures on other satellites, since failures will not generally
occur simultaneously.	 The satellite with a failed module must
wait several months for module replacement.
For this simulation study, the weights taken to geo-
stationary orbit, including weights of original. satellites,
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replacement satellites, replacement modules, and servicer, have
been calculated. It is assumed that, if costs had been calculated,
they would increase with weight.
The communications model used is similar to the one
described in the previous section. For the reliability model, ten
subsystems were selected, with the redundancy and failure rates
shown in Table 7. The degree of redundancy and failure rates shown
are typical of those in present expendable satellites. When a fail-
ure occurs, the module is replaced; in a few cases, the module weight
is much larger than the weight of the actual component. The module
weights are lighter than those shown in the previous section, but
the differences do not affect the conclusions.
Table 7. Subsystems in Reliability Model
TTI
u
u
u
0
h
-1
1	 -
Subsystem Required Provided
Failure
Rate
(10" 9 /hr)
Module
Weight
(lb)
Transponders 35 48 3000 60
Receivers 1 4 6000 66
Attitude Control 1 2 1500 60
onboard Processor I 2 700 60
Momentum Wheel , 2 700 60
Batteries 4 4 570 75
Telemetry, Tracking and Command (TT&C) 1 2 4000 75
Power Conditioning 2 2 100 60
Tanks 4 4 400 120
Thrusters 1 2 1000 120
The reliability of the satellite has been calculated for
the random failure rates listed in the preceding table and for vari-
ous times up to 10 years. For the distribution truncated at 10 years,
the calculated average lifetime is 7.9 years. This reliability is
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compatible with some specifications that require a reliability of
^	 c
0.7 at the end of 7 years. 	 It remains a moot point as to whether
satellites can consistently achieve this reliability.
Three cases have been considered: 	 expendable, servicing
ij
done upon satellite failure ("demand"), and servicing done when a
redundant component failed.	 The latter has been labeled "scheduled"
servicing in this study, and it is assumed that the opportunity for
service comes at regular intervals. 	 For the expendable mode, down
times of 4 months, 2 months, or 1 month have been assumed. 	 This is
the total time from a satellite failure until a new satellite starts .k
operation.
In the demand servicing mode, no action is taken until
the satellite has stopped operating. 	 Upon servicing, it is assumed
that all redundant components that have failed will be replaced,
and that the satellite is equivalent to a new satellite.
In the scheduled servicing mode, servicing occurs only i
at regular intervals.
	
At that time, if any redundant component has
failed, the satellite is serviced and the failed components replaced.
In actual operation, scheduling intervals would vary, and the num-
bers used in this study, 24, 12, or 6 months, would represent the
averages of the actual scheduling intervals.
i
Computer generated random numbers were used to make 200
simulated runs.	 For more accurate comparisons, correlations between
the various runs were made.
	 For example, the baseline case was a
10-yearrogram^ the calculation for a 20-year program was made byP	 Y	 p	 g
using the results for the 10-year program and extending them another
10 years.
The baseline system chosen consisted of two operating
satellites and one in-orbit spare, corresponding to the present con-
`j i
figuration for international communications over the Atlantic Ocean.
The weight penalty associated with building a serviceable satellite
(estimated as 20-30 percent) was not included. 	 The weight of the t
satellite was assumed to be 2100 pounds and that of the servicer
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for demand servicing was assumed to be 500 pounds. For scheduled
servicing, the weight of the servicer, which would be shared among
the satellites being serviced, was neglected.
The calculated availabilities and weights have been plotted
in Figure 3 for each of the nine basic cases. As might be expected,
the expendable mode shows the highest weight, The differences would
be smaller if the servicer weight for scheduled servicing and penalty
for modularization were included, but the order of increasing weights
would still be the same.
The availability for the expendable mode or demand servic-
ing is about 0.999 for a 4-month delay. It is important to note
that this availability can be achieved with scheduled servicing at
12-month intervals. in actual practice, including an occasional
"demand"'servicing and using the failure warnings provided by some
components would make it possible to achieve even higher availabili-
ties with scheduled servicing.
If the program is extended from 10 years to 20 years, the
weights launched in the expendable mode are almost doubled. But
the additional weights of modules and servicer are small, so the
total weights launched in the servicing mode do not increase
substantially. Thus increasing program life makes servicing more
attractive. The availability of the scheduled servicing mode hardly
changes, since satellites are being maintained by replacing failed
redundant components. Availabilities for the other two modes de-
crease slightly, since more failures occur in the second decade.
One conclusion from this analysis is that servicing may
be delayed for periods of a year or so without excessive avail-
ability penalties. This will depend on the degree of redundancy
that is built into the satellite; without redundancy, it is not
possible to service a satellite before failure. With servicing,
some redundancy will still be required in the satellite.
Servicing becomes more attractive if the ratio of program
life to satellite life is increased. If satellites can be built
AVAILABILITY
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Fiqure 3. Scheduled Servicing (SCH), Demand Servicing (DRM), an6
Expendable (EXP), 10-Year Pro gram---Two Operatinq and One Spare
(Number by each point is month's delay before service restored.)
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with an average life of 7 years, and if they become obsolete after
10 years, servicing is not particularly useful. On the other hand,
if a satellite has only a 5--year life, and does not become obsolete
for 15 years, then servicing becomes more attractive.
if.	 Ground refurbishment is not cost effective for most
geosynchronous satellites.
it is sometimes difficult to fully realize the distance
from the earth to the geosynchronous orbit. A greater velocity
change (AV) is required to place something in gt.synchronous orbit
than to completely escape from the earth's gravitational field.
For ground refurbishment the fuel needed to bring a spacecraft back
must first be taken to geostationary orbit. In terms of weight,
the shuttle can place 62,000 lb in low earth orbit, but the maximum
i
weight for a ground refurbishment mission (to take up a replacement
and bring back the old satellite) is only 2000 lb.
f
Y
A spacecraft may be returned to earth to clean up the
orbits, to diagnose past difficulties, or to refurbish the space-
;
craft. Cleaning up the orbits is commendable, but not part of
this study. While bringing back spacecraft for diagnosis appears
.
	
	 i
attractive, in most communications satellite failures it has been
possible to determine the failure mechanism from the telemetry 	 3
signals. In this study the primary reason for bringing back a
spacecraft is to fix it and return it to space, and the transporta-
tion costs for bringing back a communications satellite are more
than twice the cost of taking it up?
There are two suggested methods of refurbishing a space-
craft on the ground. The usual approach is to assume that the
spacecraft will be completely overhauled, each box opened and in-
spected, the spacecraft reassembled, and a complete environmental
test run. The transportation costs of bringing the spacecraft back
I:	 I
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and the costs of refurbishing it amount to a substantial fraction
of the initial cost of the spacecraft.
An alternative suggestion for refurbishing is to use a o
"bare bones" approach. When the spacecraft is returned, a module
is pulled off and a replacement is put on. The spacecraft is ready
n
to go after a few checks to ensure that the spacecraft is indeed
working. This appears to be contrary to the present philosophy
of launching spacecraft. On the other hand there may be somep	 r	 Y
question as to whether the reliability of a box is increased or
decreased by opening it up and inspecting it. 	 o-
Ground refurbishment is the one maintenance mode that
requires a full capability tug (or at least a tug that returns to
low orbit). This study has used the cost and schedule presently
quoted for the full capability tug.
ECONOMICS EVALUATIONS
4d. A tong-Life free-flying servicer at geostationary orbit
is potentiaZZy cost effective.
While initial on-orbit servicings at geostationary orbit
will probably be done with the tug (full capability or interim),
the maximum benefit can be achieved with a free flying servicer.
The argument for a free flying servicer is as follows: A drastic
change in satellite design and construction is required to build
a serviceable satellite. Once such a change has been made, this
capability, which implies many servicings (perhaps two per satel-
lite during its lifetime) should be fully exploited. The full
capability tug can stay in geostationary orbit for only six days.
A day or more may be required to move from one satellite to another
so that the full capability tug can service an average of only
three satellites.
The servicing configuration discussed here is shown in
Figure 4. It consists of a free flying servicer that will be taken
to geostationary orbit by the shuttle/tug. It will then move from
34
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Figure 4. Free Flying Servicer
(30 satellites serviced in 3 years)
dsatellite to satellite, replacing modules as it goes. After it
has serviced all .the satellites that need servicing around the geo-
stationary orbit, it may coast for a while or it may be called on
to service a satellite with a module that it has on board or a
module taken from another satellite. At regular intervals, per-
haps annually, it will be resupplied by the tug and sent out on
another round of servicing.
An efficient servicing method is to move from one ocean
region to another, servicing each satellite that needs service as
the servicer goes around the orbit. The actual schedule would
represent a tradeoff among the various priorities and the fuel
required to reach particular locations. in some cases the satel-
lite might change location to meet the servicer at some desired
point.
To determine the probable distribution of satellites,
the location of all the INTELSAT III and IV satellites, the desired
locations of a number of domestic satellites as filed with the FCC, and
the locations of a few other satellites were determined. Four clus-
ters were identified over the Atlantic Ocean, U.S.A., Pacific Ocean,
and Indian Ocean. While the exact locations of satellites in the
next decade will be different, the general pattern will be the same.
As an example, 10 satellites taken at specific longitudes,
are shown in Table 8, and a total mission time of four months was
selected to visit the 10 satellites. Velocities were selected to
minimize the fuel used in this tour. That is, higher velocities
were used for long jumps, and smaller velocities for short jumps;
velocities actually varied from 0.8 0 per day (for 5 0 jumps) to 3.70
per day (for 110 0
 jumps). This strategy may not be optimum; for
example, it may be desirable to increvse the total mission time,
that is, the time until the last servicing, and to service some of
the earlier satellites more quickly.
The actual modules that would have to be exchanged have
been estimated from data on satellite failures as well as experience
in operating a satellite system. During a period of three years,
.	 x
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Table 8. Visiting 10 Satellites -- 4 Months Fuel
5 Percent or 200 lb of Hydrazine
i
Assumed
Longitude
(°E)
Longitude
Change
(deg)
Transit
Time
(days)
Velocity
(deg/day)
AV
(ft/s)
Atlantic Ocean
340
10 9 1.1 22
330
5 6 0.8 17
325 40 18 2.2 44
U.S. 285 15 11 1.4 27
270 10 9 1.1 22
260 5 6 0.8 17
255 75 25 3.0 60
Pacific Ocean
180 10 9 1.1 22
170 110 3€7 3.7 73
Indian Ocean
60
Total 123 days 305 ft/s,
.3
30 satellites would be serviced. About half of these would receive
modules with new batteries and transponders. Other modules replaced
would probably include receivers, earth sensors, momentum wheels, 	 -t
and various electronic components. This list is still preliminary,
and will .Mange as some components become more reliable. For satel-
lites that require north-south stationkeeping, it is expected that
refueling will be quite attractive. These satellites may be launched
with four or five years of fuel and refueled every three years.
If the free flying servicer exchanges modules on 30 satel-
lites, its cost per servicing becomes quite small. The estimated
5 percent for fuel per year is quite conservative. The main cost
factors then become the price of building a satellite to be ser-
viceable and the cost of building and transporting the new modules
to geostationary orbit. one added benefit is that many shuttle/tug
flights can be loaded with additional modules or fuel, so that the
loading factor for the tug should improve with a system that
includes a free flying servicer.
Once a free flying servicer is available and the cost
per servicing is low, new possibilities emerge. It then becomes
feasible to perform many servicing operations that do not justify
a separate shuttle/tug flight. In particular, satellites that are
still operating should be serviced. Servicing can then be used to
increase the reliability of an operating satellite: design failures
can be corrected, failed redundant components and wear-out items
replaced., and fuel added.
4f. ExpendahZe satellites are cost effective when satellite
lifetime meets program Zifetime requirements.
A key factor in the evaluation of servicing is the ratio
of satellite lifetime to program lifetime. Satellite lifetime is
the average time that a satellite operates until some failure destroys
its usefulness (using some predetermined definition of successful
i
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L 4d	 operation). Program lifetime is the length of time before a
satellite becomes obsolete and must be replaced by a new genera-
tion of satellites.
The li:etime of communications satellites has been of
the order of a few years. INTELSAT I (Early Bird) was designed
da	 for one year and lasted considerably longer. INTELSAT III had an
average lifetime of only two years. INTELSAT IV was designed for
a7-year lifetime, but it is too early to determine the actual
value. In the future, a 5-year lifetime can probably be achieved,
S '
but the feasibility of a 10-year life is still questionable.
The program life of communications satellites has been
fairly short. There have been four generations of international
ne
communications satellites during the course of 10 years. In the
y
	
	 future, program lifetime will be considerably longer. The launch
of the first INTELSAT V is presently planned for around 1979, which
is eight years after the first launch of INTELSAT IV. However,
since there is also an INTELSAT IV-A, it is debatable whether that
period of eight years should be equivalent to one generation or
two. Plans for INTELSAT VI are still sketchy, but a launch in
1986 is a possibility; this implies a program lifetime of seven
E!
	
	 years for INTELSAT V. Thus, at present and for the foreseeable
future, the program lifetime is not much greater than the antici-
pated satellite lifetime.f:
For most of the mission models in the SSPD document, 2 it
is difficult 34--o determine the program lifetime in the sense used
--	 above. The assumption was that, within the 13 years under study,
substantially identical spacecraft were launched. For international
communications satellites it was assumed that launches in 1980 were
the same as those in 1990.	 A 7-year lifetime was used and it was
assumed that servicing would extend the useful lifetime of this
satellite for another seven years.
For most of the geostationary orbit programs in the 1980's
a program lifetime of over 10 years is rather optimistic.	 However,
is
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for the 1990's it becomes a more realistic assumption. There is a
definite trend toward increasing program lifetimes, and it is only
a matter of time before program lifetimes of 10 years or more will
be realized.
VI.	 STUDY LIMITATIONS
The conclusion that on--orbit servicing is attractive in
geostationary orbit is subject to several limitations. 	 The ratio
of satellite lifetime to program lifetime has just been discussed
in the last section.	 The other limitations can be discussed in
terms of the cost of servicing versus the benefits to be derived. °1
The cost of a servicing operation includes the cost of
the modules, the transportation costs, the added cost of making the
satellite serviceable, the costs of operations, and the cost of the
servicer.	 The transportation costs can be decreased if the number
of servicings per mission is more than one.	 If the probability of
servicing a satellite is low, then the added cost of modularizing A
unserviced satellites must be added to the costs of servicing a
A
satellite.	 For example, if only every third satellite is serviced,
then the costs of each service operation must include the costs of -J
modularizing three satellites. -T
It is usually assumed that a satellite to be serviced
is not carrying communications traffic; instead, the traffic may
be on an in-orbit spare or an outage may have occurred. 	 The pos-
sibility of servicing a satellite while it is operating needs
further study.	 Although there are problems involved in shutting
off power to a module and maintaining attitude control, these may •'
not be insurmountable. 	 Several minutes are required to switch
traffic to an in-orbit s are at a different Ion n " Ad= 	 while suchP	 g
an outage is tolerable, it is undesirable. Even if an outage
occurs during the shock of docking, such an outage may be preferable
to switching the traffic to a spare satellite.
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E'	 Another limitation of these studies is that there has
^a been a tendency to compare present expendable maintenance modes
with future on-orbit servicing. It may be possible to improve the
expendable mode (e.g., by increasing satellite lifetime), and the
potential advantages of such improvements must be compared 6 with
the potential savings of on-orbit servicing.
S
ria
VII.	 IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH
The development of an on-orbit servicer maintenance sys-
tem can be useful to many spacecraft programs. It can be used
with both standardized modules and with modules built for a single
program or satellite. Standardized modules will yield some cost
savings due to standardization and will also be more readily
available on the earth or in space. On the other hand, a pivot-
ing arm servicer can handle nonstandard modules, even of different
sizes, as long as there is some standardization of latch-attach
x	 mechanism and end effector.
The orbital maintenance system considered here is com-
patible with the space transportation system as presently configured.
In some respects the shuttle/tug to geostationary orbit can be used
more efficiently if the loading factor is increased by adding
modules and fuels for satellites already in orbit.
On-orbit maintenance with the pivoting arm servicer is
compatible with a variety of delivery vehicles. The baseline con-
	
°"	 figuration is the orbiter and the full capability tug. In low
	
s=	 orbit the servicing can be done with a pivoting arm servicer, or
alternatively with the shuttle remote manipulator system or extra-
vehicular activity. In geostationary orbit, servicing can be done
directly with the full capability to or a free flyingY
	P 	 Y g	 Y g servicer.
	
g'	 The free flying servicer implies a vehicle that remains in geo-
stationary orbit; this may be a vehicle built especially for the
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purpose, a solar electric propulsion system, or a modified interim
upper stage.
VIII.	 SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL EFFORT
}
6a.	 Users need guarantees that servicing mitt be available
and assurances that it wilZ be cost effective.
o	
`,
Any potential user of a service system must be assured
that the service will be available at a reasonable cost when he ^!
needs it; otherwise, he will be reluctant to incorporate service--
ability in his design. 	 To provide this assurance, there are a few
°•F
}I possible mechanisms.	 if the service system is government-owned, A:
a government promise to maintain and provide a service system for
a period of at least 10 years (perhaps 20 years for some users)
beyond the point at which the user decides to employ a serviceable
design is necessary.	 is the government's promise sufficient? 	 How
will future costs be determined? 	 if service is provided by a com-
mercial entity- -either the spacecraft contractor or a separate ^-
servicing company- -can the user be protected by contract in terms
of costs and future performance? s	 _^
INTELSAT's performance-type contracting would work here;
for example, an INTELSAT contract could include scheduled service
by the contractor with future service ::harges calculated by some
mutually approved equation. 	 The third possibility is a user-owned
and operated system.	 Only here does the user have complete control
and hence confidence. 	 Of course, only the larger users are likely
to have sufficient service functions to justify the ownership.
Commercial sale of surplus service capacity to smaller users becomes
a possibility. ,^
Unlike launch services, the commitment to service a space- €
craft program extends many years into the future, particularly in
d
the case of commercial communications satellites.
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6b. A deeper understanding of the orbital servicing cost
structure is required before initiating drastic changes
in conventional satellite construction and operations
methods.
The present studies have examined the traffic model and
estimated the potential cost savings. However, it must be real-
ized that project managers have greater confidence in methods
that have proven reliability. Furthermore, the actual benefits
for a program require a deeper analysis than was possible in the
present studies. Unless compelling reasons are found for ser-
vicing in a particular program, the project manager is likely to
prefer the well-proven expendable maintenance mode. A savings
of 10 or even 20 percent in a program may not be sufficient to
justify on-orbit servicing.
6c. Scheduling delays of several months are tolerable
for many servicing requirements.
To achieve the maximum benefits of servicing, it must
be used to improve the reliability of operating satellites as
well as the repair of failed satellites. Analysis of communica-
tions satellite operations indicates that the majority of servic-
ings will be done on operating satellites. The urgency of
servicing is then drastically reduced, since it depends on the
reliability of remaining equipment. The results of one study,
shown in Figure 3 on page 32, indicate that, if redundant elements
are replaced with an average delay time of 6 months, the perform-
ance of the system (availability) is better than if servicing is
delayed until the satellite fails and the satellite is serviced
with an average delay of two months. The former will require more
servicing operations, but if the cost of these operations can be
made sufficiently small, then the system performance will justify
the servicings.
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6d. Development of the on-orbit servieer should include
early in-space demonstrations of module exchange
along with rendezvous and docking.
A number of studies have already investigated the tech-
nical feasibility of unmanned module exchange and module exchange
has been demonstrated on the ground. The next step is to prove
by demonstration in space that this is feasible. This demonstra-
tion will not only be useful in proving the feasibility, but will
also indicate the ease of certain operations and perhaps some
problem areas that still need additional research.
Rendezvous and docking have been demonstrated by NASA on
numerous occasions during the past years. For servicing opera-
tions far from the orbiter, it will be necessary to show that
unmanned rendezvous and docking are also feasible. For servicing
of operating satellites it may be desirable to increase the accu-
racy of rendezvous and decrease the closing velocity at impact.
6e. Building, flying, and servicing a serviceable satellite
are needed to obtain widespread acceptance of orbital
servicing.
In spite of many studies and demonstrations, widespread
acceptance of orbital servicing will require many years. The
development will take place slowly. it will progress from low
orbit, where the manr_ed shuttle is available, to geostationary
orbit, where it is not. It will be first be applied to large,
expensive satellites where the benefits are dramatic and then
progress to smaller, cheaper satellites.
Project managers are hesitant to accept new methods,
particularly those involved with commercial communications satel-
lites. while some acceptance may come in the 198Y's, widespread
use of servicing the geostationary orbit will probably not be
i
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fully accepted until. the 1990's. The tug is not available until
the early 1980's.
A few project managers may make a decision based on a
flight demonstration of servicing. Many project managers will
	
a
wait until a number of operational programs have proven the advan-
tages of servicings in the late 1980s. After a project decision
is made, two or three years are needed to build and launch a
satellite, and additional years will be needed before servicing
occurs.
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